Abstract. Suppose the members of a group (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) each form a judgment on which worlds in a given set are possible, subject to the constraint that at least one world is possible but not all are. The group seeks to aggregate these individual judgments into a collective judgment, subject to the same constraint. I show that no judgment aggregation rule can solve this problem in accordance with three conditions: "unanimity", "independence" and "non-dictatorship". Although the result is a variant of an existing theorem on "group identi…cation" (Kasher and Rubinstein 1997), the aggregation of judgments on which worlds are possible (or permissible, desirable, etc.) appears not to have been studied yet. The result challenges us to take a stance on which of its conditions to relax.
Introduction
How can a group of individuals (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) make collective judgments (true/false) on some propositions based on the group members' individual judgments on these propositions? This task -"judgment aggregation" -becomes non-trivial when the propositions are interconnected, as shown in a growing literature. Suppose a three-member group seeks to make collective judgments on p, q, and p^q, where one member judges all three propositions to be true, a second judges p to be true but q and p^q to be false, and a third judges q to be true but p and p^q to be false. Then majorities judge p and q to be true and yet p^q to be false, an inconsistent set of majority judgments. This problem has been called the "discursive dilemma" (Pettit 2001, extending Kornhauser and Sager 1986) and shown to illustrate a more general impossibility result Pettit 2002, 2004 In this short paper, I want to draw attention to a di¤erent judgment aggregation problem not discussed in that literature, which arises when propositions are modelled as sets of possible worlds. Here each group member's judgment consists in the acceptance of a single non-contradictory and non-tautological proposition, represented by a set of worlds deemed possible by that individual. The group then seeks to make a collective judgment, which also consists in the acceptance of a single non-contradictory and non-tautological proposition, represented by a set of worlds deemed possible by the group. Thus the problem is to aggregate an n-tuple of non-contradictory and non-tautological propositions (across n individuals) into a single non-contradictory and non-tautological proposition (for the group as a whole).
The theorem I want to put on the table for discussion shows that it is impossible to solve this problem in accordance with some seemingly mild conditions: "unanimity", "independence", and "non-dictatorship". Mathematically, this result is a variant of an existing theorem on the so-called "group identi…cation" problem by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) , but to the best of my knowledge the interpretation proposed here -i.e., the application to judgments on which worlds are possible -is new. Here I derive the theorem from a recent theorem on judgment aggregation in the standard sense (Dietrich and List forthcoming-a; Dokow and Holzman 2005) , which, in turn, has precursors in abstract aggregation theory (Wilson 1975; Rubinstein and Fishburn 1986; Nehring and Puppe 2002) .
As the di¢ culties with judgment aggregation are usually thought to stem from the presence of multiple, interconnected propositions, it is surprising that an impossibility result can arise even when individual and collective judgments consist only in the acceptance of a single proposition. It is also worth noting that the result applies not only to judgments on which worlds are possible, but also to judgments on which worlds are permissible, or desirable, etc. In each of these cases, the theorem poses interesting questions.
Theorem

Let
= f! 1 ; :::; ! k g be a …nite set of worlds, assuming k > 2; and let N = f1; :::; ng be a …nite group of individuals, assuming n > 1. Each individual i 2 N makes a judgment on which of the worlds ! 2 are possible (e.g., relative to his/her evidence, but various interpretations of the formalism can be given). Formally, a judgment is a subset J . We say that J is consistent if J 6 = ? and informative if J 6 = . Making a consistent and informative judgment thus consists in accepting a non-contradictory and non-tautological proposition. Let J be the set of all consistent and informative judgments.
The group requires a method of aggregating each n-tuple of consistent and informative individual judgments (J 1 ; :::; J n ) 2 J n into a consistent and informative collective judgment J 2 J . Call such a method an aggregation rule, de…ned as a function f : J n ! J . Can we …nd an aggregation rule that meets some minimal conditions? Let me introduce three conditions. The …rst requires that if all individuals submit the same judgment, this judgment should also be the collective one. The second requires that the collective judgment on whether a given world ! is possible should depend only on individual judgments on whether ! is possible, not on individual judgments on whether other worlds ! 0 6 = ! are possible. The third requires that the collective judgment should not always be determined by an antecedently …xed dictator.
Unanimity. For all J 2 J , f (J; :::; J) = J.
Independence. For all (J 1 ; :::; J n ); (J 0 1 ; :::; J 0 n ) 2 J n and all ! 2 ,
Non-dictatorship. There is no i 2 N such that, for all (J 1 ; :::; J n ) 2 J n , f (J 1 ; :::; J n ) = J i : Surprisingly, these three conditions cannot be satis…ed simultaneously. Theorem 1. There is no aggregation rule f : J n ! J satisfying unanimity, independence and non-dictatorship.
A proof is given in the appendix. In the case n = k, theorem 1 is equivalent to a theorem by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) on the problem of "group identi…cation". Here the n members of a group each make a judgment on which members of that group have a certain property (e.g., being a true scientist or having a particular religious identity), subject to the constraint that at least one individual has the property but not all individuals do. The group then seeks to aggregate the n individual judgments on who has the given property into a resulting collective judgment. Here, too, no aggregation rule can simultaneously satisfy unanimity, independence and non-dictatorship.
Illustration
While the full proof of theorem 1 is somewhat technical, the intuition behind it can be conveyed by considering a more restrictive class of aggregation rules and showing that this class is empty. Consider an aggregation rule that satis…es not only unanimity, independence and a strengthened version of non-dictatorship, namely "anonymity" (i.e., all individuals have equal weight in determining the collective judgment), but also "monotonicity" (i.e., if more individuals judge that a given world ! is possible, this cannot turn a collective judgment that ! is possible into one that ! is impossible) and "neutrality" (i.e., the criterion for determining the collective judgment on whether a given world ! is possible is the same for all worlds !). (In standard judgment aggregation, various general characterizations of aggregation rules satisfying these conditions are given in Nehring and Puppe 2005 and Dietrich and List forthcoming-b.) A necessary condition for an aggregation rule to meet all these conditions is that it is a threshold rule with some acceptance threshold t 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, de…ned as follows. For all (J 1 ; :::; J n ) 2 J n , f (J 1 ; :::; J n ) is the set of all worlds ! judged possible by at least t individuals, formally f (J 1 ; :::; J n ) = f! 2 : number of i 2 N with ! 2 J i tg.
Examples of threshold rules are the union rule f (J 1 ; :::; J n ) = J 1 [ ::: [ J n (here t = 1), the intersection rule f (J 1 ; :::; J n ) = J 1 \ ::: \ J n (here t = n), and simple majority rule (here t is the smallest integer greater than n=2).
Can we …nd an acceptance threshold such that the corresponding threshold rule assigns to every n-tuple of consistent and informative individual judgments a consistent and informative collective judgment? It is easy to see that, to ensure consistency, the threshold must not be too high, i.e., it must not happen that no world is deemed possible. A necessary and su¢ cient condition is t < n k + 1; e.g., the union rule guarantees consistency. To ensure informativeness, the threshold must not be too low, i.e., it must not happen that all worlds are deemed possible. A necessary and su¢ cient condition is t > n k 1 k ; e.g., the intersection rule guarantees informativeness. So the conjunction of consistency and informativeness requires the acceptance threshold to satisfy n k 1 k < t < n k + 1. If there are n > 1 individuals and k > 2 possible worlds, as assumed, this inequality can easily be seen to have no solution. (In the degenerate case of k = 2 possible worlds and an odd number of individuals n, simple majority rule meets all conditions.) Therefore the class of aggregation rules satisfying the conditions of theorem 1 together with monotonicity and neutrality (and non-dictatorship strengthened to anonymity) is empty when n > 1 and k > 2. The full proof shows that this impossibility continues to hold even without monotonicity, neutrality or the strengthening of non-dictatorship to anonymity.
Avoiding the impossibility
As with other impossibility results of social choice theory -notably, Arrow's (1951) theorem on preference aggregation -the signi…cance of theorem 1 lies not primarily in establishing the impossibility of solving a particular aggregation problem, but rather in indicating which conditions must be relaxed in order to …nd a solution. The following escape routes are available:
Relaxing unanimity. If unanimity is dropped, a constant aggregation rule satis…es all other conditions. Such a rule assigns to every n-tuple (J 1 ; :::; J n ) 2 J n the same …xed collective judgment J 2 J . This is not an attractive solution, as it pays no attention to the judgments submitted by the individuals.
Relaxing independence. If independence is dropped, a distance-based aggregation rule can be constructed (inspired by the approach in Pigozzi 2006) , which satis…es all other conditions. For each n-tuple (J 1 ; :::; J n ) 2 J n , we here compare each "candidate" collective judgment J 2 J with each submitted individual judgment J i , using the following method. We say that J agrees with J i on a given world ! if [! 2 J if and only if ! 2 J i ]. For each individual i 2 N , we now count the total number of worlds ! 2 on which J agrees with J i and consider the sum-total of these counts across individuals i 2 N . The collective judgment J 2 J is then chosen so as to maximize this sum-total (with some additional provisions for breaking ties). Under such an aggregation rule, the collective judgment on whether a given world is possible depends not only on individual judgments regarding that world but also on individual judgments regarding other worlds. If this implication is accepted, a distancebased aggregation rule may be a satisfactory solution to the present aggregation problem.
Relaxing non-dictatorship. If non-dictatorship is dropped, a dictatorial aggregation rule satis…es all other conditions. Such a rule assigns to each ntuple (J 1 ; :::; J n ) 2 J n the judgment J i of the same antecedently …xed individual i 2 N . For obvious reasons, this is not generally an attractive solution.
Restricting the domain of admissible inputs. If the aggregation rule is required to work not for every possible n-tuple of individual judgments but only for those that meet some additional constraints, then unanimity, independence and non-dictatorship can be satis…ed simultaneously. For example, if only ntuples (J 1 ; :::; J n ) satisfying J 1 \:::\J n 6 = ? are admissible, then the intersection rule as de…ned above meets all conditions. Likewise, if only n-tuples (J 1 ; :::; J n ) satisfying J 1 [ ::: [ J n 6 = are admissible, then the union rule as de…ned above meets them. A domain restriction of this kind is feasible in cases where the diversity in individual judgments is limited. If, for example, judgments represent the knowledge (as opposed to mere beliefs) of individuals, then it may seem reasonable to assume that only n-tuples (J 1 ; :::; J n ) with a non-empty intersection occur, and the intersection rule may seem plausible.
Extending the range of admissible outputs. If the aggregation rule is permitted to generate collective judgments that violate consistency or informativeness, then it is possible to satisfy all other conditions simultaneously. For example, if judgments represent the beliefs of individuals (rather than their knowledge), then perhaps the requirements of consistency or informativeness are too strong at the collective level. As already noted, the union rule guarantees consistency (but not informativeness), and the intersection rule guarantees informativeness (but not consistency), while both rules satisfy unanimity, independence and non-dictatorship. More radically, one might permit collective judgments that take the form of continuous probability assignments across worlds as opposed to binary judgments of possibility or impossibility; but probability aggregation gives rise to some well-known problems of its own.
In conclusion, I have shown that a non-trivial impossibility result of aggregation arises not only for judgments on multiple, interconnected propositions, as in the much-discussed "discursive dilemma", but also for judgments that each consist in the acceptance of only a single proposition, modelled as a set of possible worlds. Whether or not we …nd this result compelling, it challenges us to take a stance on which of its conditions to relax. the standard sense). It is easy to see that F satis…es the standard unanimity and
